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Security Council

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Letter dated 11 October 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 11 October 2000, received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

00-68515 (E) 121000

Annex

Letter dated 11 October 2000 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with paragraph 16 of resolution 1051 (1996), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is requested to submit consolidated progress reports every six months to the Security Council commencing 11 April 1996,[1] on the Agency's verification activities in Iraq pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions.

As has been previously reported, the Agency has not been in a position, since 16 December 1998, to implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions. It is thus unable to provide any measure of assurance with regard to Iraq's compliance with its obligations under those resolutions.

From 23 to 25 May 2000, the Agency was able to complete the destruction, in Jordan, of a filament-winding machine and its associated spare parts and raw materials owned by Iraq. Iraq initiated procurement of this equipment and material in mid-1990 for use in its clandestine uranium enrichment gas centrifuge programme. The machine was received in Jordan in July 1991, and remained stored there until May 2000 (see S/1996/261 and S/1996/833 for details of the origin and whereabouts of those items).

Since the establishment of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), contacts have been maintained between the Agency and UNMOVIC in order to coordinate efforts as required under the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284 (1999). The Joint Unit related to the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) has been reconstituted, and its modus operandi, with regard to staffing, shared data and secure communication, defined. A revision and updating of the nuclear-related list of items and technology to which the mechanism applies (annex 3 to the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan) has been initiated by the Agency. A final draft is currently being prepared, after technical changes with relevant experts from UNMOVIC and Member States.

During the past six months, the Agency has also refined the structure and content of its information system in the areas of computer support to inspections and analytical tools. An enhanced analysis of the available original Iraqi documentation has also continued, as well as an assessment of the results accumulated through the past inspection process. These analytical activities have confirmed the validity of the Agency's technically coherent picture of Iraq's past clandestine nuclear programme.

The Agency remains prepared to resume verification activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions at short notice. If it were to resume verification activities in Iraq, and provided that it could satisfy itself that Iraq's past and present nuclear activities and nuclear assets have not changed since December 1998, the Agency would be in a position to move to the full implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan. This plan, as designed, would enable the Agency to investigate the few remaining questions and concerns that relate to Iraq's

past clandestine nuclear programme, along with any other aspect of this programme that may come to its knowledge.

Finally, if the Agency were unable in the near future to resume verification activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions, it would have to initiate, pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement with Iraq, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and as I explained in my letter to the President of the Council of 10 December 1999 (S/2000/120 of 15 February 2000), another physical inventory verification of the nuclear material subject to safeguards in the coming months.

I should be grateful if you would kindly arrange for this report to be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohamed **El Baradei**

Notes

[1] The previous consolidated reports of the Director General of IAEA were circulated in documents S/1996/261 of 11 April 1996, S/1996/833 of 7 October 1996, S/1997/297 of 11 April 1997, S/19997/779 of 8 October 1997, S/1998/312 of 9 April 1998, S/1998/927 of 7 October 1998, S/1999/393 of 7 April 1999, S/1999/1035 of 7 October 1999 and S/2000/300 of 11 April 2000. Document S/1998/694, dated 27 July 1998, contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 14 May 1998 (S/PRST/1998/11). Document S/1999/127, dated 9 February 1999, contained the text of an interim status report provided in response to the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100).